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I. Introduction:
This paper aims to examine the role of Turkey in the European 
energy market in the context of European Energy Security 1.
In the paper we will attempt to answer two main questions: 
1. What will the future role of Turkey be in the global 
energy market? As is usually argued, can Turkey play 
a leading role as an energy hub or an energy corridor/
transit land in the European Union’s energy security? 
Can Turkey satisfy expectations of the EU for its energy 
security in the future? Is Turkey irreplaceable as a transit 
land, through which natural gas and oil from Russia, 
the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, are 
brought to the global energy markets? Who are other 
political and economic competitors in the region?
1 The author would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt 
Stiftung for granting this research project. My thanks go also to the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) for providing me with excellent research 
facilities and working environment during my stay in Berlin. I would like to 
thank to Dr. Adnan Vatansever, Carnegie Endowment, for his criticism and 
comments.
32. It has been tirelessly argued by Turkish politicians 
and experts that the new role of Turkey in the energy 
markets would help it become a full member of the EU. 
Is this a realistic view or wishful thinking?2
II. European Energy Security 3:
The energy supply of EU/27 is currently based for the most 
part on fossil energy sources: The total primary energy 
consumption is covered by 36 percent crude oil, 24 percent 
natural gas, 18 percent coal, 13 percent nuclear energy and 8 
percent renewable energy. Since the EU/27 can only cover 3/5 
of coal consumption through its own domestic production, it 
is heavily dependent on imports of oil and gas with 83 and 60 
percent, respectively. According to the baseline-scenario, the 
EU’s import dependency will increase until 2030 continuously 
and reach 94 percent in the oil and 83 percent in the gas sector. 
In other words, unless the EU can make domestic energy more 
competitive, in the next 20 to 30 years around 70% of the 
Union’s energy requirements, compared to 50% today, will be 
met by imported products – some from regions threatened by 
insecurity. Energy reserves are concentrated in a few countries 
and today, roughly half of the EU’s gas consumption comes 
from only three countries (Russia, Norway, and Algeria). 
Following current trends, gas imports would increase to 80% 
over the next 25 years.4
2  For an interesting paper closely related to the topic, see: Kramer, 
Heinz, 2010a, “Türkei als Energiedrehscheibe”, (Berlin: SWP).
3   See for statistical data on energy: Eurostat, 2009: Energy Yearly Sta-
tistics 2007, (Luxemburg: . For energy forecasting of the EU Commission, 
see: European Energy and Transport, 2008: Trends to 2030 - Update 2007, 
(Luxemburg: ). For further information about the EU’s energy policy, see: 
Commission of the European Union, 2006: The Green Paper: European 
Strategy for Sustainable Competitive and Secure Energy,  pp. 4-5. Geden, 
Oliver; Dröge, Susanne, 2010: “Integration der Europäischen Energiemärk-
te“, in: SWP-Studie, (Berlin:.
4   Barrossa, José M., 2009: “Political Guidelines for the Next Commis-
sion”, EU Commission, Brussels 3rd September 2009, p.31.
4III. Turkey’s Energy Sector:
Turkey is a gas and oil-importing country and its energy 
consumption depends heavily on the imports of crude oil and 
gas from the region. Turkey imports around 22 million tons 
of crude oil annually, whose cost to the Turkish economy 
was (together with gas and petroleum products) around US 
$ 31 billion in 2009. But the demand for crude oil has had 
a decreasing tendency due to the world financial crisis and 
it has dropped from 23.4 million tons in 2007 to around 15 
million tons in 2010.5 The demand for gas imports as an energy 
resource points to the same picture. According to projections, 
gas imports rose from 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 1995 to 
54 bcm by 2010 and will rise to 66.6 bcm by 2020, of which 41.8 
bcm have already been secured by purchasing agreements.6 
This figure indicate that Turkey is going to be one of the most 
attractive energy markets for oil and gas producers of the 
Caspian Basin and the Middle East in the future. 
Russia is the main energy supplier (natural gas and crude oil) 
of the Turkish economy. The energy sector, one of the main 
fields of economic co-operation between the two countries, 
has been making a significant improvement in the last years. 
Turkey imports around 68 percent of its gas and one-third of its 
oil from Russia. It is important to note that almost 50 percent 
of Turkey’s electricity can be produced by natural gas and a 
substantial amount of coal is imported from Russia. At the same 
time, the increasing demand for energy resources all around 
the world and specifically the increasing energy dependency 
of consumer countries on suppliers force European countries, 
including Turkey, to secure the imports of energy resources and 
diversify energy routes in order to reduce their dependency on 
Russian suppliers. 
5  www.dpt.gov.tr “Main Economic Indicators”, October-
December 2010.
6  www.botas.gov.tr/indexasp 19 February 2010.
5With its geo-strategic location between the major oil consumers 
in Europe and the enormous natural energy reserves in Central 
Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, where the world’s 
largest oil and gas fields and reserves are located, Turkey 
emerges as an important partner in addressing the challenge 
of securing the uninterrupted transportation of energy to the 
global markets.7 Pipelines can become tools of political leverage 
in times of both peace and conflict. A country such as Turkey 
with historically close ties to the West and the East bears the 
potential to shape the balance in favour of stability. 
Turkey’s attention on oil and gas producing countries in the 
region can be explained by three main factors: 
•	 Firstly, Turkey wants to close the huge gap between the demand 
for fuel oil and natural gas and the supply of energy resources 
in the domestic market by importing energy sources from 
neighbouring countries. As a matter of fact, the Turkish side 
has attached particular importance to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran because of their huge oil 
and gas reserves.
•	 Secondly, another complementary reason might be that Ankara 
seeks to lessen the Turkish economy’s increasing dependence 
on Russia step by step. This means that Turkey wishes to 
substitute Russian gas and oil by energy resources from the 
Middle East and the new Turkic Republics in order to insure its 
energy demand for the future. 
•	 Thirdly, there is severe competition not only between producer 
countries, but also among consumer countries over the 
transportation of Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas to 
Europe. Ankara hopes that with the construction of new gas 
pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Europe (Nabucco project), 
the Turkish economy will gain revenues from royalties and 
7  This paper will not be focussing on the demand and supply condi-
tions of natural gas and oil reserves in the world as well as in the Russian 
Federation, the Caucasus, Iran, Central Asia and the Middle East. For 
detailed information about oil and gas production and estimated reserves 
see British Petroleum, 2009: Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008, 
(London) , pp.6, 8, 22 and 24.
6transportation fees and will be able to use part of the imported 
oil for its own consumption and energy production. In this 
respect, the EU’s energy security policy and Turkey’s ambition 
to become an energy actor in the region complement each 
other.
IV. Where does natural gas come from?
The energy cooperation between Turkey and the Russian 
Federation started in Soviet times, in February 1986. The two 
gas companies Botas and Gazeksport signed an agreement over 
the supply of 6 bmc from the Soviet Union through the eastern 
Balkans to Turkey, which was supplied in 1987. Additionally, 
the second gas agreement between the Turkish firms Botas 
& Gama and the Russian firm Gazprom, which established a 
joint venture named Turusgas via the Balkan pipelines began 
in December 1997 and lasted for 23 years (Russian Federation-
Westward).8
An important step concerning the Turkish-Russian gas co-
operation was taken on 15 December 1997. During PM Victor 
Chernomyrdin’s visit to Turkey, two gas agreements were 
signed: The first agreement focused on building the undersea 
gas pipeline Blue Stream in cooperation with the Italian energy 
cooperation ENI. The pipeline takes the route Izobilnoye-
Dzhubga-the Black Sea-Samsun-Ankara and is 1213 km long, 
including 392 km running under the Black Sea. The Blue Stream 
gas pipeline was completed in 2002 and the official “Blue 
Stream opening ceremony” was held in November 2005 with 
the participation of the Russian, Turkish and Italian leaders. 
Through the Blue Stream pipeline, Turkey is now receiving 
16bmc from Russia. The second agreement was based on 
the supplies of Russian gas to Turkey via the Blue Stream gas 
pipeline, by which the annual pumped gas should have been 
increased from 2bmc to 16 bmc (2007).
8  See table www.botas.gov.tr
7Besides Russia, Turkey imports natural gas from two other 
sources: The Baku-Tiblisi-Erzurum (BTE) or South Caucasus 
Pipeline (SCP) began transporting natural gas from Shah Deniz, 
which has been in operation since 2006 with a maximum 
capacity of 6.6 bcm. It is being planned that Trans Caspian 
Kazakh gas and Trans Caspian Turkmen gas shall connect with 
the SCP. The realisation of this latest project seems to be highly 
questionable since Turkmenistan and Russia signed a 25 year 
sales agreement providing a maximum capacity of 80 bcm to 
Russia in 2003. The second line, Iranian gas, is carrying gas 
from Iran to Turkey and has a maximum capacity of 10bcm 
since 2001.9
  
V. Recent Developments in the Energy Sector:
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Turkey on the 6th 
of August 2009 to deepen and strengthen the bilateral economic 
and political cooperation between the two neighbouring 
countries. His visit to Turkey as Russian President on the 5th 
and 6th of December 2004 was the first of its kind in 32 years.10 
Putin and Turkish PM Erdogan met ten more times in the five 
following years. The Turkish President Gül visited Russia and 
the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan in February 2009.
 
The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his 
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin signed, on August 6 2009, a 
series of agreements on cooperation in the fields of oil, natural 
gas and nuclear energy.11 
The final communiqué released by Ankara and Moscow after 
9  Turkey and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for 
transporting Iranian Turkmen gas to Europe. See Arinc, Ibrahim S., 2007: 
“The EU-Russian Gas Interdependence and Turkey”, in: Insight Turkey, 9, 
4: p.27.
10  During his first visit to Turkey, Putin signed six agreements in the 
field of military and economic cooperation.
11  The Italian PM, Silvio Berlusconi joined the ceremony in Ankara. 
The Italian company ENI broke ground on the trans-Anatolian oil pipeline 
this year. ENI and Gastrom have planned South Stream for a long time.
8the meeting made the following points. Only time will tell 
whether these agreements will actually lead to tangible results.
1. Turkey allows the Russian company Gazprom to carry out 
feasibility studies in its territorial waters for the South Stream 
pipeline which rivals the Nabucco project, backed by the EU 
and the US. The South Stream pipeline, which will cost approx 
€ 24 billion, for a 63bcm/y gas pipeline, will transport natural 
gas from Russia via the Black Sea to Bulgaria and finally Europe 
and into two main streams to Italy and Austria.12
2. In return, Russia will provide oil to a pipeline stretching from 
the Turkish city of Samsun, on the Black Sea coast, to the town 
of Ceyhan, on the Mediterranean coast. The accords signed 
between the two countries will support Ankara’s ambitious 
goal of becoming a regional energy hub.13 
3. The planned Blue Stream II aims on the one hand at transporting 
Russian gas through Turkey to Hungary (South European Gas 
Pipeline) and on the other hand at carrying Russian gas via 
Turkey to Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Cyprus.
4. Turkish and Russian delegations also discussed cooperation 
in nuclear energy. A consortium led by the Russian firm 
Atomstroyexport, controlled by Gasprom, placed the sole bid 
in the tender to build a 4.000-megawatt nuclear plant and 
operate Turkey’s first nuclear power plant near Mersin on the 
Mediterranean coast. However, the negotiations on the price 
of the electricity to be sold to the Turkish state have been 
under way for some time, and the local authorities have not 
announced a final ruling on the tender yet. 
5. Russia wants to build large gas storage facilities near the Tuz 
 
12  Winrow, Gareth, 2009: “Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus: Common 
and Diverging Interests”, in: Briefing Paper, (London: Chatham House).
13  According to EuroActv.de (21.10.2009), the Russian state-owned 
energy companies Transneft and Rosneft will guarantee to transport the 
required amount of crude oil from Samsun to Ceyhan. The Italian energy 
company ENI and Turkish firm Çalık Holding will also participate in this 
project. 
9Lake near Ankara and a liquefied natural gas terminal (LNG) 
in Ceyhan.
VI.  International Gas Pipeline Projects:
Concerning the oil and gas transportation from the region 
through Turkish territory to Europe, several projects, agreements, 
protocols, and official statements are on the agenda, but of 
the cost and benefits of all these projects we know very little. 
There is some estimation by various institutions, but the cost 
sharing among participating countries is not clear-cut or well-
defined.14 For example, the total cost and contribution of each 
partner country to the Nabucco project is still unclear. 
According to BOTAS (Petroleum Pipe Line Cooperation), there 
are currently 6 Gas Line Projects on the agenda. For a detailed 
description of the project see www.botas.gov.tr 15
1. Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas pipeline Project (ITGI);
2. Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas 
Pipeline Project;
3. Egypt-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project; 
4. Iraq-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project;
5. Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project ;
6. Natural Gas Underground Storage Projects
14  For the relative cost advantages of Turkish energy transport see 
Tekin, Ali; Williams, Paul A., 2009: “Europe’s External Energy Policy and 
Turkey’s Accession Progress”, in: Center for European Studies Working 
Paper Series, 170, Harvard University, pp.10-12.
15  See www. botas.gov.tr
10
MAP 1: INTERNATIONAL GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS
Source: www.botas.gov.tr 
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VII. Special Case: Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project
Ankara signed an important pipeline agreement and thus 
drew the attention in the headlines of international media. 
One of these agreements was an inter-governmental transit 
agreement called the “Nabucco Pipeline” (named after the 
opera by Verdi) signed between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary, and Austria on July 13 2009. The Nabucco pipeline, 
which is supported by the EU and the USA, is an alternative 
route to Russian deliveries to Europe via the Ukraine. The 
3,300 kilometre pipeline aims to bring Caspian gas to western 
European energy markets and to diversify the current natural 
gas suppliers and delivery routes for Europe, by pumping 
gas from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in 
Austria.16 It is estimated that the pipeline will have a total cost 
of around € 9 billion; the capacity lies at approximately 30 bcm 
of natural gas yearly with the expectation that the pipeline 
will be in operation by 2014-15.17 Meanwhile discussions have 
focused upon connecting the Caspian countries’ huge natural 
gas reserves to the Nabucco pipeline in order to export their 
gas to Europe. It is argued that South Stream and Nabucco are 
two competing projects aiming at carrying natural gas from the 
Caspian basin and exporting it to the same destination, namely 
the European markets.18
16  Ankara aims to use 15% of the natural gas crossing Turkish terri-
tory for its own domestic consumption. 
17  See  EurActiv, 6 July 2009, p.1. The Nabucco consortium consists 
of leading European Energy companies: OMV of Austria, MOL of Hun-
gary, RWE of Germany, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria,Transgaz of Romania and 
Botas of Turkey. Interestingly, three consortium members -OMV, MOL and 
Bulgargaz- have already signed up to Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline. 
Ironically, the German politicians seem to be keenly interested in gas 
business: Ex Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was appointed as chairman of 
the board of North Stream which is a Gazprom pipeline project bringing 
gas from Russia via the Baltic Sea to the northern German coast. Now 
the Nabucco consortium has contracted former German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer as a senior consultant for the project.
18  Baran, Zeyno, “Oil Oligarchs and Opportunity: Energy from Cen-
tral Asia to Europe: Testimony to the US Senate”, Committee on Foreign 
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The fundamental question remains open: how will the Nabucco 
pipeline be filled and from where will sufficient quantities of 
gas be secured in order to close the gap in European long-
term demand for natural gas? On the one hand the BTE would 
transport about 10-15 bcm per year of Azeri gas to Europe 
which would equal an insignificant part of European future 
consumption of 700 bcm. But on the other hand, although it 
seems paradoxical, in June 2009, Azerbaijan signed a deal with 
Gazprom to sell gas to Russia from 201019 and Turkmenistan 
signed a 30 year agreement with China for exporting natural 
gas. Iran has agreed (accepted with price reservation) to sell 
10 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG), equivalent to 
14 bmc of natural gas, to China.20 It is obvious that both gas 
supplier countries and Turkey play a double game on energy 
security between the West and the East.
VIII. Where does oil come from?
While Turkey’s demand for oil can partly be satisfied through 
domestic oil production (around 4.45 million tons a year 
maximum), it remains an oil importing country and its energy 
production depends heavily on oil imports. Since the 1970s, 
however, Turkey has begun playing an active role in the oil 
industry. 
1. The first steps were taken to construct twin oil pipelines 
between Kirkuk- Ceyhan (Yumurtalik) on the Mediterranean 
Relations, Washington DC, 12 June 2008. . Interestingly, Zeyno Baran, a 
Turkish-American expert of Hudson Institute, Washington DC argued that 
“…If South Stream is built, Nabucco will not be, at least not for Caspian 
gas…all that Caspian gas is going to pour into it…” See euobserver.com: 
“Turkey plays a double game on EU energy security” by Valentina Pop 
07.08.2009.
19  On the 29th of June 2009, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev 
signed a deal in Baku to import Azerbaijani gas to Russia from January 
2010. See Euractiv 6 July 2009.
20  Götz, Roland, “Europa und China im Wettstreit um Ruslands Erd-
gas?“ SWP-Aktuell (18 April 2006): 6.
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coast of Turkey. The first part was put in operation in 1977; the 
second in 1987. Both pipelines carry 400 000 bbl/d around 14 
million barrels of crude oil. Iraq has the third largest crude oil 
reserves in the word with around 115 billion barrels. Due to the 
Iran-Iraq war and American-British intervention in Iraq in the 
1990s, the transportation of the crude oil from Iraq has been 
interrupted several times and recently  been reopened again.
2. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) is a 1,768 kilometres 
(1,099 mi) long crude oil pipeline established in 2006 and 
transporting 1 million barrels (160,000 m3) of oil per day from 
the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea via 
Tbilisi (Georgia ) to Ceyhan by the Mediterranean Sea.21
3. The so-called “Trans Anatolian/Samsun- Ceyhan” Project by-
pass oil pipeline will have three basic advantages for Turkey:
•	 Around 3.7% of the world’s daily oil consumption is 
shipped through the Turkish Straits. The amount of 
oil and oil products transported through the Strait of 
Istanbul has increased dramatically from 60 million tons 
in 1996 to almost 150 million tons in 2007. The Samsun-
Ceyhan Pipeline will reduce the oil transportation by 
oil tankers and the Straits will be relieved from the 
seaborne transportation of oil in the Black Sea22. The 
number of ships sailing through the Bosporus is also 
three times higher than the traffic on the Suez Canal, 
for example. 
•	 Consequently, the Turkish government has enforced 
some new regulations by modifying the Montreux 
Convention (1936) regarding the Straits, in order to 
secure marine traffic and to afford safety for the 15 
million inhabitants of Istanbul. Ankara’s intention, by 
21  Partner enterprises are: BP, SOCAR, Chevron, Statoil Hydro, TPAO, 
Eni, Total S.A., Itochu, Inpex, ConocoPhillips, Hess Corporation.
22  The number of oil tankers and other dangerous cargo vessels pass-
ing through the Strait of Istanbul rose by 90% in the last 7 years alone 
from 4,248 in 1996 to 10,054 in 2007. Similarly, the amount of hazardous 
cargo increased from 60.1 million tons in 1996 to 143.9 million tons in 
2007, which is an increase of 130%.
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these measures, is to by-pass the Straits and to effect a 
final decision on pipeline routes. With this step, Ankara 
has wanted to impose restrictions on the passage of 
shipping, especially vessels carrying oil and nuclear 
waste, through the Turkish Straits. The new regulations 
stipulate that tankers should notify the Port Authority, 
be given pilotage assistance, and that passage fees 
should be adjusted.23 
•	 The Samsun harbour would be the main energy cross 
junction for oil and gas from Russia, Caucasus and 
Kazakhstan. In that case, Ceyhan would be upgraded 
to an “International Oil Market” in the Mediterranean 
Region. It has been estimated by the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe that Turkey may transport 6-7 
percent of global oil production by 2012. 
IX. External Factors: 
Turkey’s role in the global and European energy market as 
energy hub or as a transit country will be closely connected 
not only with economic factors but also with the external 
and internal political and economic development both in and 
around Turkey. Now we will look at external and internal 
determinants which may influence the role of Turkey in the 
energy market through the setting of transit routes of energy 
resources from the region to Europe.
The successful implementation and realisation of all these 
projects depend on external and internal economic, political 
and security factors: The Middle East and the Caucasus are 
among the world’s most unstable and unreliable regions in 
which friends and enemies can change overnight without 
23  The 1936 Montreux Convention regulates and guarantees free pas-
sage for international shipping through the Straits except in wartime. Dur-
ing the Cold War period there was no serious dispute on the Straits and 
Turkey seemed to be ready to accept the international role of the Soviet 
Union and its allies as a military power. It can be argued that both sides 
were satisfied with the implementation of the Montreux Convention until 
1992.
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any notice. As evidence of this fact, Turkey’s role in energy 
transportation will strongly depend on political balances, 
outcomes of conflicts and alliances. 
X. Caucasus:
Oil and gas producers have four options for the transport of 
gas/oil from the Caspian basin: (1) Transportation of gas and 
oil from the Caspian region and Azerbaijan via Georgia and 
Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. In this respect, Georgia is 
very important as a land corridor connecting Turkey with 
Azerbaijan and the Caspian region. If the Russian-Georgian 
conflict re-escalates, the transportation of oil and gas from 
the Caspian basin and Azerbaijan would be endangered. (2) 
Secondly, the possibility of a route of the gas pipeline running 
across Armenia does not look hopeful as long as the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute between Baku and Yerevan remains unsolved. 
(3) The construction of the pipeline from the Caspian region 
across Iran to the Gulf Sea would be another alternative which 
would enable natural gas to be transported to world markets. 
This could enable especially Azerbaijan to be less dependent 
on transportation routes through Russia and Turkey. For the 
time being, this possibility seems to be unrealisable due to the 
American-Iranian dispute over Iran’s nuclear power program. 
(4) Both Nabucco and the South stream pipelines plan to 
transport natural gas from the Caspian region passing through 
Georgia and Turkey as well as Russian territory to the European 
markets. 
Turkey’s main interest in relations with Baku lies in the possibility 
of transporting Azeri oil from Baku through Georgia to Turkey 
and to the Mediterranean Sea (BTC). Russia and Turkey and 
partly Iran are three important players in the Caucasus. Now 
Washington, as an active and powerful player, joined the game. 
The U.S. administration aims to reshape the post-communist 
era by gaining influence in and around the Caspian Sea. With 
this step, Washington will create an overall balance of power 
16
between Russia and Iran in the region, whereas the other 
countries, mainly Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, are given 
secondary roles and do not play as independent actors in the 
game.
Turkey’s interests in the Caspian region can be summed up in 
four main points:
•	 Unquestionably, Russia has been regarded as an 
“energy super power “and its economy is mainly based 
on energy exports to Europe, the main destination of 
Russian energy resources. Russia still has the leading 
role and is the only truly great power in the region. 
Ankara is now aware of the Russian influence existing in 
the region and Turkish officials have finally understood 
that Moscow is highly sensitive concerning the issue of 
its exclusiveness and direct intervention into the internal 
affairs of the recently independent countries. In other 
words, Ankara at last realised that the Russian presence 
and influence in Transcaucasia cannot be erased in a 
short time. Any attempt to displace Russia’s military, 
political, and economic dominance in the region will 
cause an aggressive overreaction from Russia. 
•	 One of the main issues and controversies between 
Ankara and Moscow concerns the transit routes of oil 
and gas from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to the 
world market. Moscow was adverse to the construction 
of BTC and insisted that the new oil and gas pipeline 
should cross Russian territory. Currently, Russia seems 
to be determined to continue to control this important 
economic weapon so as not to lose the economic 
benefits of the oil and gas business.
•	 For relations between Turkey and the Central Asian 
states, Transcaucasia has been seen as a passageway 
and plays the role of a bridge. Therefore, peace and 
stability in the three countries, namely Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan will best serve Turkey’s 
17
economic and political interests. As a result, Ankara 
believes that this aim can only be achieved by decreasing 
the hegemonic power of Russia through close mutual 
economic cooperation. Although Russian and Turkish 
interests are bound to clash in the region, Ankara is not 
in a position to change nor is it interested in changing 
the status quo or in solving conflicts through direct 
military intervention which could lead to the escalation 
of conflicts. 
•	 Nevertheless, the main field of economic cooperation 
between Turkey and Russia will be the energy sector. 
In spite of some controversies between Ankara and 
Moscow concerning the transit routes of oil and gas 
from Russia, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to the 
world market, both countries have intensified their 
relations in the field of energy transportation.
XI. Iran:
Iran could be taken into consideration as one of the possible 
transport routes, both to Turkey and the Gulf. For the 
transportation of Iranian natural gas to Turkey by a gas pipeline, 
Necmettin Erbakan, the former Turkish Prime Minister, signed 
a US$23 billion gas supply deal with Iran, committing Turkey 
to a 20-year contract and the construction of a 1000-mile 
pipeline between the two countries. The gas deal has been 
strongly criticised in the American press and is regarded as a 
direct challenge to one of the Clinton administration’s central 
foreign policy goals, which aimed at isolating Iran as a state 
that sponsors terrorism and seeks nuclear weapons.24 For these 
reasons Washington, with the help of the D’Amato Act, wanted 
to penalise foreign companies that invest US$40 million or 
more a year in the oil and natural gas sectors of such a country. 
The gas deal with Iran was important for two reasons: Firstly, 
Turkey is heavily dependent on the import of energy and 
24   See The New York Times (13 August 1996) and Financial Times (9 
August 1996).
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demand for energy is increasing very rapidly as a result of 
industrialisation. It is estimated that the Turkish economy 
will not be able to cover the increasing demand for energy 
with its own resources in the next 15-20 years. Thus, Ankara 
is keenly interested in signing gas deals not only with Iran 
but also with Turkmenistan, with which it has already signed 
an agreement two years ago, and with other gas exporting 
countries. Secondly, Turkey’s main gas supplier is Russia and 
therefore Ankara wants to reduce its dependency on Russian 
gas exports by diversification of its gas supply. 
Teheran has had a lot of experience in the energy sector and 
the technology for the production and transportation of oil and 
gas. But there has been strong American resistance against Iran. 
Therefore, Teheran was not able to take a share in the Azeri 
“Deal of the Century” as a result of the Anti-Iranian policy of 
Washington.25 Washington’s strategy to sustain its dominance 
of the Middle East/Eastern Mediterranean region rests on two 
pillars: maintaining the uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern 
energy resources to the U.S-Atlantic Alliance and preventing 
any single power or constellation of hostile powers from 
dominating the region. The US leadership supports Israel 
militarily and economically without any restrictions and is 
only interested in security matters and fighting against anti-
terrorist activities. The USA wants to break Russian influence 
and Moscow’s control on energy sources in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. The US policy against Iran and its domestic 
political development and power structure in the country will 
25  U.S. Undersecretary of State Stuart Eisenstadt underlined in his visit 
to Paris in February 1998 “We feel very strongly there should be no pipe-
line across Iran. No ifs, ands, or buts. Iran shall not be given” a choke-
hold over energy development in the Caspian going west.” Instead the 
United States is “trying to encourage… the creation of an east-west trans-
portation corridor that goes through the Caspian Sea and through the 
Caucasus”.  “Europe Said interested in Pipeline Skirting Iran”, Turkistan 
Newsletter, (25 February 1998):. 
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determine the transportation of  Iranian energy to the world 
market via Turkey. 
PM Erdogan’s last visit to Iran and his harsh criticism of Israel’s 
policy against Palestinians in the Gaza strip have created a 
problem for Turkey’s strategic allies as well as the West, by 
raising questions and doubt over the alliances of Turkey in 
the region.26 Interestingly, the increasing numbers of critics 
in the Western media and among experts on Turkey’s foreign 
policy related with Iran and Israel have drawn the attention of 
Western capitals recently. 
PM Erdogan’s meeting with US President Obama in Washington 
on December, 7th 2009 according to the BBC news meant that” 
… the US wants Turkey to use its ties with Tehran to deliver 
tough messages, not just sign gas and trade deals…”27 The 
most interesting comment came from two American experts 
on Turkey who supported the AKP’s domestic policy and its 
new neighbouring policy advocating “zero problems with 
neighbours”. Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey analysed 
Turkey’s foreign policy which has been followed since 2002. 
The authors warned the present Turkish government, headed 
by PM Erdogan, that Ankara was crossing the line of what is 
politically advisable and doable. 28
26  See some increasingly critical voices: Strauss, Delphine: “Tukey’s 
Ottoman Mission”, Financial Times London (23 November 2009): 
Schenker, David: “A NATO without Turkey”, Wall Street Journal Europe, 
(5  November 2009), “Looking east and south” (29. Oct. 2009); Lerch, 
Wolfgang G., “Neuer Osmanismus”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (11 
November 2009).
27  Chattis, Kim: “Can President B. Obama still count on Turkey?” BBC 
news (7 December 2009).
28  Abramowitz, Morton; Barkey, Henry J. (2009): “Turkey’s Transform-
ers”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, No:6 (November/December):pp.1-7
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XII. Iraq and the Gulf states:
The Iraq-Turkey gas pipeline project is one of the attractive 
projects on the agenda. Nevertheless, because of present and 
future economic and political uncertainties in Iraq after the 
planned withdrawal of the American forces from Iraq in 2011, 
it is not possible to make any predictions on the development 
in Iraq. The country has been divided into three parts and 
there is no consensus on the distribution and exploitation of 
energy sources among the federal states. Therefore, the oil and 
gas transportation from Iraq via Turkey to Europe through the 
Nabucco pipeline seems to exist only on paper for the moment. 
On the other hand, Gulf producers are transporting their oil 
and gas by using sea routes and therefore they do not show any 
interest exporting their products overland.
XIII. Internal Factors: Political and Economic Conditions 
An important truism of international relations is that political 
and economic interests are intertwined. To a large extent, 
overlapping mutual economic interests will constitute a platform 
from which sustainable political relations can be launched. 
Consequently, the ability of a country to offer sizeable and 
stable economic opportunities is a prerequisite to enter into 
sustainable international economic relations. Therefore, the 
capacity to create and maintain a stable domestic economic 
structure is of utmost importance. 
One of the dimensions of that capacity is the existence of 
political structures, which can be achieved only with long-
term-oriented stable macroeconomic policies within an open 
economy. In other words, the envisaged leading role in the 
region cannot be successfully achieved without considerable 
national economic effort in creating sustainable economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability. Therefore, it seems 
useful and necessary to discuss the economic development and 
performance of Turkey and its international economic relations 
in recent years in order to find out whether Ankara is able to 
fulfil and justify the expectations for a leading political role 
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in the region. The resolving of the so called “Kurdish issue” 
is vitally important to transport gas and oil from Eastern and 
south-eastern Anatolian to European markets. If the PKK 
targets gas pipelines in the eastern and south-eastern part of 
Turkey, the continued fighting between the PKK and military 
forces may damage Turkey’s prospects of becoming a key 
energy transport land to Europe.29
XIV. Conclusion
We can draw the following lessons from the discussion of the 
role of Turkey in the newly emerging energy routes and its 
impact on Turkey’s full membership of the EU:
1. Turkey is poor in energy sources, it is not an oil and natural 
gas producing country, and therefore heavily dependent on 
imports of oil and natural gas from abroad, mainly Russia. 
Turkey is the third largest importer of Russian natural gas after 
Germany and Italy. Turkey is thus one of the major customers 
of Russian natural gas and partly crude oil supplies. 
2. It is plausible to base Turkey’s energy policy on two goals: 
Firstly, the nation wants to satisfy its increasing demand for 
energy resources through diversification of gas and oil imports 
from the different suppliers in order to reduce its one-sided 
energy dependency on Russia. Secondly, Turkey wants to play 
an important role in the global energy market as an energy 
transit country for one simple reason: Turkey’s proximity to 
regions with 70 percent of the world’s proven oil and gas 
reserves. According to statistics, around one-third of worldwide 
crude oil production and almost one-fifth of worldwide natural 
gas production (excluding Russia) were exploited in the region 
in 2008. In the same year it is estimated that two-third of 
 
29  Until now Russian had a powerful “gas lobby” in Turkey, but now 
the new domestic companies such as “Calik Holding” and “Ciner Hold-
ing”, which are owners of some influential media firms in Turkey, will 
surely act as new players and they will try  to change the power structure 
in Turkey’s energy sector.
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worldwide crude oil reserves and currently half of the natural 
gas reserves lay in the Middle East.
3. No doubt gas and oil producers from the Middle East, the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia develop energy projects 
to increase their gas and oil export via transit countries to 
European and world markets. Above all, each consumer/
producer country aims to diversify the import/export of gas 
from/to different regions in order to reduce its dependency on a 
single country.  Russia wants to diversify its gas transportation 
routes by bypassing Ukraine and Belarus. Moscow further 
intends to replace Ukraine as the main transit route for gas 
exports mainly to Europe by establishing North and South 
Stream Gas pipelines. At the same time, the EU countries want 
to break their own dependence on Russian gas supplies by 
transporting non-Russian gas through Turkey and through 
non-Russian territory. 
4. “Energy security” has become a catchword in the EU states, 
particularly in Brussels after the gas cut to the Ukraine by 
Gazprom on December 31, 2005 and the oil cut by Transneft 
to the transit country Belarus in January 2007. The EU has 
correspondingly intensified efforts at diversifying energy 
suppliers, sources, and transportation routes. Brussels 
consequently prepared its own new project “Southern gas 
corridor” (Nabucco), transporting Caspian natural gas to 
Europe via Turkey. The economic interests of producer and 
consumer countries thus largely overlap. In other words, both 
sides follow a policy of reducing dependency by diversifying 
transit routes. Due to its geographical and geopolitical position, 
both producing and consuming countries consider Turkey as a 
favourable transit route for the transport of oil and gas through 
its territory to Europe. 
5. The critical question is: What might the role of Turkey be in 
the global energy market? Turkish policy makers in Ankara 
strongly believe that Turkey is going to become a leading and 
dominating energy hub through the transportation of natural 
gas and oil from the Caspian region, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf 
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states to the European and world markets. Yet, for two reasons 
the role and influence of Turkey in the world energy market is 
clearly limited. Firstly, Turkey is unable to set the natural gas 
prices in the global energy market. It is a price taker and so 
far it is not able to regulate prices and quantities demanded 
and supplied in the market. Additionally, Turkey has neither 
the necessary infrastructure for the transportation of natural 
gas and crude oil, nor the sufficient capital to become an 
important actor in the international energy market. Therefore 
Turkey is forced to take on the role of a transit country between 
consumers and suppliers by collecting transit revenues, 
royalties, and satisfying its own energy demand. 
6. Interestingly enough, inspite of the above limitations, Ankara 
strongly believes that the new energy corridors will facilitate 
Turkey’s bid for full membership of the EU. Turkish policy 
makers have been trying to connect Turkey’s new role as an 
energy corridor (Nabucco) with EU membership.30  Part of 
their argument stems from EU representative’s frequent stress 
on the importance of Turkey for European energy security.31 
Of course Turkey’s role in European energy security may be 
significant32 and energy routes through Turkey are one of the 
main arguments of European opinion makers who favour 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. But it seems to be inadequate and 
too early to establish any link between the Turkish accession 
process with European energy security. Perhaps it could be 
considered as one of the positive arguments and supporting 
30   Ali Tekin & Paul A. Williams “Europe’s External Energy Policy and 
Turkey’s Accession Process” (2009), CES Working Paper Series.No:170; 
Winrow, Gareth (2009) “Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus: Common and 
Diverging Interests”, Briefing Paper, (London: Chatham House).
31  Winrow, Gareth, op.cit., pp. 12-14.
32  Former Foreign Minister and current President of Turkey Abdullah 
Gül stated that “Turkey’s membership perspective and the ongoing acces-
sion negotiations with the EU will be driving force for the realisation of 
joint projects which will enhance the supply security of Turkey and the 
EU.” See joint press release 2007: “Turkey and the EU: Together for Euro-
pean Energy”, Istanbul, 5 June.
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factor for Turkey’s membership in the EU. But it is interesting 
to note that despite the serious disputes between Moscow and 
Kiev concerning gas transportation, the Ukraine is still the most 
important transit country for the European energy market. 
Additionally, the Ukraine is keenly interested in becoming a 
full member of the EU. It is obvious that Ukraine’s exporting of 
Russian gas to Europe through its own territory would not have 
helped Kiev to be declared at least a candidate country. For the 
time being, it is advisable for Ankara not to overestimate and 
exaggerate its role in the global energy market. 
7. The energy giant Gasprom aims in the long term to dominate 
not only the domestic but also international energy markets.33 
According to the long term strategy presented at Gasprom’s 
annual meeting on the 29th of June 2007, the Russian 
multinational company plans to achieve two main strategic 
objectives: First, it aims to increase the natural gas production 
by exploiting new gas fields in the Jamal peninsula in North 
Siberia, Field Bovanenkova and Field Charasavej, in order 
to satisfy both the domestic and the foreign demand for gas. 
Second, the high level of investments in the exploitation of 
gas fields and building of new pipeline routes indicates that 
Gasprom is trying to prevent the entrance of competitors into 
the energy market. 
8. It seems to be uninterested in competition with other producers 
and strives for becoming an “Energy Super power”.34 Gasprom 
is obviously following a double strategy: on the one hand, it 
absorbs (imports) gas from Central Asia for the demand of its 
domestic market and on the other hand, it supplies European 
consumers. With help of this strategy, Gasprom can take 
33  Götz, Ronald, 2007: “Gasproms Zukunftsstrategie: Marktbeherr-
schung und Expansion“, in: SWP-Aktuell 39, (Juli), 1-4.
34  Westphal, Kirsten, (2007): “Russland-Energie Großmacht“, paper 
for the conference Russland in der internationalen Politik-Rückkehr einer 
Großmacht?, SWP-KAS and DGO, Berlin, 24-26 January. 
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energy markets under its own control and establish a monopoly 
position in the European energy markets, determining the 
price of gas in the European energy market as long as the 
gas price is closely linked with the oil price. Additionally, 
with  the construction of the “North Stream”, South Stream 
and extension of Blue Stream II, Gasprom intends to weaken 
the negotiation positions of transit countries such as Belarus, 
Ukraine and Moldova.
9. It is interesting to note that Gasprom wants to dominate the 
energy market in the transit and consumer countries. In the 
case of Turkey, the gas business is based on the “take and 
pay” rule.35 Therefore, the consumer country has a limited 
negotiation space and resisting capacity against Gasprom. On 
the other hand, Gasprom has expressed interest in buying or 
participating in the still existing energy firms in the importing 
countries. In the case of Turkey, Russian investors failed 
because Turkey would not allow Russian investments in the 
sensitive telecommunication and energy sectors.36 Russia 
signed an agreement with the national gas companies of Italy, 
Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece in May 2009 for the construction 
of the South Stream. It was a deal between Gasprom and Eni/
Italy to increase its originally planned capacity.37
To sum up: Besides Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq are the most 
promising countries in the region. Iran possesses the largest 
gas reserves in the world after Russia and Turkmenistan with 
35  This means the obligation to receive the amount of gas as set down 
in the contract, with a simultaneous ban on its re-export.
36  See detailed information on the business story in CES Report op.cit. 
part II Warsaw, July 2007, p.80.
37  An interesting article about the gas business of Russian firms with 
Western Balkan countries, especially between Russia and Serbia, is 
published by SWP, see Reljic, Dusan (2009): “Russland Rückkehr auf den 
Westbalkan” SWP –Studien 2009/S17 17, (Juli 2009) pp. 24-30.
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its nearly 28 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves38. 
Due to the political conflict between Iran and the USA, for 
the time being, transporting Iranian and eventually Turkmen 
gas via Turkey to Europe does not seem possible.39 There are 
two other options: the possible construction of gas pipelines 
from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the Caspian 
region. The second one is the transportation of gas from Iraq 
and from the Gulf states. Such transportation of gas from Iraq 
and the Gulf states will be heavily dependent on what the 
political structure of Iraq will look like after the withdrawal of 
American forces from the country in 2011. The Gulf states can 
transport their gas and oil by sea; moreover, for the time being, 
they do not seem to be keenly interested in transporting gas 
and oil overland to the world market.
In the short run, Russia will continue playing a dominant role 
in the European and Balkan energy markets as long as the main 
oil and gas suppliers Iran and Irak remain out of the game. 
Turkey is not a major energy producer and heavily dependent 
on importing two-thirds of its natural gas from Russia. For 
the time being, the future of the Nabucco pipeline will be 
determined by these major factors: First, the main source of 
the Nabucco pipeline would convey only about 10-15 bcm 
annually of Azeri gas to Europe, a fraction of the EU’s predicted 
future annual consumption of 700 bcm.40 Secondly, problems 
38  British Petroleum (BP), 2009: Statistical Review of World Energy , 
June ( London:), pp. 24, 27.
39  Ian Lesser, an analyst of the German Marshall Fund argued that 
“The [Obama] administration is far more sensitive to what Turkey does 
with Iran.“ See “Russia and Turkey-Old Rivals, New Partners”, econo-
mist.com (Aug 13 2009):  In his article “Erdogan pflegt in Theran die 
Freundschaft mit Iran” in Neue Züricher Zeitung (29.October 2009) Jürg 
Bischoff reports that interestingly, the Turkish Minister of Energy Yildiz 
announced that Turkey will invest the amount of around $4 billion to 
exploit the Iranian gas fields South Pars.
40   Roberts, John, 2004: “Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and Security 
Issues”, in: CEP, Brussels, 2-3.
27
with Baku over the Ankara-Erivan rapprochement and its 
impact on Nagorno-Karabakh, gas pricing, and re-export issues 
would jeopardise the construction of the pipeline. As far as 
can be predicted, Russia will continue to satisfy the European 
demand for natural gas by diversifying transportation routes in 
the coming decades. For the time being, Turkey can take part 
in Gastrom’s energy policy and European energy security as a 
transit country and in the meantime cover its own consumption 
demand for energy.
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